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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0), Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), and Utah Code Ai}n. § 78-2a-3(2)G). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Jim 
and Melodie Imus (hereinafter "Imuses") on their boundary by equitable estoppel claim? 
Standard of review: "A grant of summary judgment is 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 112 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 
1989). A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Gerbich v. Numed 
Inc., 1999 UT 37, f^ 10, 977 P.2d 1205. Whereas summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law, appellate courts give no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); s\e also CECO Corp., 772 
P.2d at 969. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the 
appropriate only when no 
Court "view[s] all facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and recite[s] the facts 
accordingly." Mast, 971 P.2d at 929. 
This issue was preserved for appeal insomuch as the |muses asserted the boundary 
by equitable estoppel claim in their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R at 478-48); Rob and Sherri Bahr and 
'Bahrs") opposed the Imuses' boundary by equitable estoppel claim in their 
lone Senn (hereinafter 
1 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R at 664-
667); and the Bahrs argued against the Imuses' boundary by equitable estoppel claim at 
the August 20, 2007 oral argument hearing (R at 1206, pg. 39:7 - 44:20). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from a boundary dispute between neighbors of adjoining parcels 
of property in a residential subdivision. The Imuses bought their property in 
approximately March 1983. In approximately August 1983, a fence was constructed that 
attempted to divide the Imuses' property from the Bahrs' property. The fence was paid 
for by the Imuses and its location was determined by the Imuses and the Bahrs' 
predecessors in interest. The Bahrs bought their home in approximately December 1988 
and questioned the Imuses regarding the fence's location. In or about March 2002, the 
Bahrs hired a contractor to construct an addition onto the side of their home and property 
that is adjacent to the fence and Imus property. The Bahrs' contractor informed the Bahrs 
that, based upon his measurements, the fence encroached upon their property. The Bahrs 
informed the Imuses, on at least two occasions in 2002, that they believed the fence 
encroached upon their property, which the Imuses denied was the case. The parties' 
dispute escalated, which resulted in complaints being filed with Sandy City by the parties 
against one another. In the fall of 2003, the Bahrs, at the recommendation of a Sandy 
City official, obtained a survey, which survey verified that the fence encroached upon the 
2 
Bahrs' property by approximately .2 feet towards the front of their property and 
approximately 4.7 feet at the back of their property. 
B. Proceedings Below 
On or about April 2, 2004, the Bahrs filed a Complaint against the Imuses. (R at 
1.) The Bahrs asserted, among other causes of action, quiet title to the portion of property 
on the Imuses' side of the fence that a survey demonstrated Was part of the Bahrs' 
property. (R at 5-9.) On or about May 4, 2004, the Imuses filed their Answer and 
Counterclaim, which Answer asserted the defense of estoppejl and Counterclaim asserted 
various causes of action regarding the disputed parcel of property. (R at 19-39.) On or 
about June 2, 2004, the Bahrs filed their Reply to the Counterclaim, which Reply asserted 
the defense of estoppel. (R at 40-50.) On or about January 18, 2005, the Imuses filed an 
Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim, which Amended Answer asserted the 
defense of estoppel and Amended Counterclaim asserted various causes of action 
regarding the disputed parcel of property. (R at 87-107.) OI^ L or about January 25, 2005, 
the Bahrs filed their Reply to the Amended Counterclaim, which Reply again asserted the 
defense of estoppel. (R at 110-119.) Discovery was conducted by the parties. On or 
about January 19, 2007, the Imuses filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum 
in Support and Affidavits in Support. (R at 215-486.) On of about January 31, 2007, the 
Bahrs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support. (R at 
487-579.) On or about March 1, 2007, the Bahrs filed their Memorandum in Opposition 
3 
to Motion for Summary Judgment. (R at 648-800.) On or about April 2, 2007, the 
Imuses filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment 
and their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R at 
801-908; R at 921-1028; and R at 1038-11461.) On or about April 30, 2007, the Bahrs 
filed their Reply to the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R at 1159-1169.) On or about August 20, 2007, a hearing was conducted 
before the Honorable Paul G. Maughan. (R at 1185.) On or about September 11, 2007, 
the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision granting the Imuses' Motion for 
Summary Judgment based upon the boundary by equitable estoppel doctrine. (R at 1196-
1192.) On or about October 16, 2007, the Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion 
to Compel was entered by the trial court. (R at 1193-1196.) The Bahrs filed their Notice 
of Appeal on November 13,2007. (Rat 1197-1198.) 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. In approximately March 1983, the Imuses purchased their property located 
at 2084 Buckingham Way, Sandy, Utah. (R at 235.) 
2. At the time that the Imuses purchased their property, the adjoining property 
at 2074 Buckingham Way was owned by Brent and Brenda Wyman, who are the Bahrs' 
!This appears to be a duplicate filing of the Imuses' Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which is first contained in the 
record at pgs. 801-908. 
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predecessors in interest. (R at 217, ^ f 1; see also R at 676, pg. 26: 23-25.) 
3. Shortly after moving into their home, the Imusqs approached Brent and 
Brenda Wyman regarding constructing a fence between their respective properties 
(hereinafter "Fence"), which the Wymans agreed to. (R at 217-218, ^ 2-3.) 
4. The Imuses also approached their other neighbor, Mr. Dalton, about 
building a fence between their respective properties, which lylr. Dalton agreed to. (R at 
710, pg. 31:3-32:2.) 
5. The Imuses, Mr. Dalton and Brent Wyman (but not Brenda Wyman) 
participated in measuring the property lines to locate their respective fences, which 
measurements were completed by using the Imuses' tape measure. (R at 711, pg. 33:2-
20; see also R at 683, pg. 53:9-55:17.) Also, the Imuses, Mr. Dalton and Brent Wyman 
(but not Brenda Wyman) participated in constructing the Fence. (R at 678-679, pgs. 
36:24-37:2.) 
6. During the measurement process, Brent Wymap expressed his desire to 
accurately determine the boundary line. (R at 711, pg, 34:13-18.) Jim Imus assisted 
Brent Wyman in the measurement of the 2074 Buckingham Way property. (R at 711, pg. 
36:11-13.) 
7. After measurements were completed, the Imusps and Wymans believed that 
the Fence properly marked the boundary between their respective properties. (R at 711-
712, pgs. 34:13-36:13, 37:16-18; see also R at 684, pg 57:l(j-58:12.) 
5 
8. There is no admissible evidence in the record from Brent Wyman that he 
indicated his belief that the Fence properly marked the boundary between the 2074 and 
2084 Buckingham Way properties.2 Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence 
that the placement of the Fence resolved an actual dispute or disagreement about the 
proper boundary line between the 2074 and 2084 Buckingham Way properties. In short, 
the Imuses or Wymans simply believed the Fence marked the proper location of the 
boundary line between their respective properties, which location had been determined 
through their mutual efforts. 
9. Neither the Imuses nor the Wymans hired a surveyor to assist in locating the 
true boundary line. (R at 712, pg. 38:14-15; see also R at 680, pg. 43:7-8.) 
10. In or around June 1985, the Wymans sold the 2074 E. Buckingham Way 
property to Joe Carlisle, another predecessor in interest to the Bahrs. (R at 248.) 
11. In or about December 1988, the Plaintiffs Rob and Shenri Bahr purchased 
the 2074 E. Buckingham Way property from Mr. Carlisle. (R at 727, pgs 12" 18-13:6.) 
12. After their purchase of the 2074 E. Buckingham Way property, the Bahrs 
commented to and questioned the Imuses several times over the years that the Fence did 
not appear to be straight and that they believed it encroached upon their property, which 
2Imuses' counsel indicated in the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment the following: "Executed originals of the Wyman affidavits are 
filed separately herewith, and unexecuted copies are attached hereto as Exhibits D and 
E." (R at 463, Tf 3.) However, the record does not contain an executed Affidavit of Brent 
Wyman. (R at 222-227). 
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the Imuses always denied was the case because the Imuses had measured and properly 
placed the Fence on the boundary line when it was installed. (R at 748-749, pgs. 15:23-
18:12; see also R at 749, pg. 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 26:1947:5; R at 752, pgs. 31:24-
32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R at 754, pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-45:22; R at 
756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R at 758-
759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, pgs. 
16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-24; R 
at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; and see also R k 782-783, pgs. 13:7-15:6; 
Rat 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) 
13. Despite the multiple discussions regarding the Fence over the years, the 
parties' disagreement escalated to the point where complaints were filed one against 
another with Sandy City. Id. 
14. Finally, at the recommendation of a Sandy City official, the Bahrs obtained 
a survey that was conducted by Peterson Engineering, P.C. (R at 794; see also R at 742, 
pg. 70:2-16.) 
15. The Peterson Engineering Survey found that tfye imuses' side of the Fence 
contained approximately from .2 feet of the Bahrs' property at the front to approximately 
4.7 feet of the Bahrs' property at the back of their property. (R at 794.) 
16. The Imuses also conducted a survey, which suWey found that the Imuses 
had approximately 1.12 feet of the Bahrs' property a few feet from the front to 
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approximately 4.37 feet of the Bahrs' property at the back of their property. (R at 796.) 
17. The Imuses have only paid the property taxes for their property as set forth 
in their warranty deed, legal description and based upon the plat map. (R at 693, 
pgs.94:5-95:15.) 
18. The Imuses' use of the disputed property has consisted of using it for 
planting things in it, watering it, caring for it, and enjoying it. (R at 712, pg. 40:6-21.) 
19. No longer having access to the disputed property would impact the Imuses 
through loss of shading and privacy. (R at 713, pg. 41:7-12.) 
20. The Imuses have not submitted any proof that they have made permanent 
improvements to the disputed property, nor have they established when improvements 
were made, nor have they submitted evidence that establishes the value of their property 
with any such improvements versus its value without such improvements. 
21. The Bahrs were bona fide purchasers for value, who took the 2074 E. 
Buckingham Way property without notice of adverse claims or interests to the property. 
(R at 732, pgs. 32:23-33:8.; see also R at 743, pg. 74:9-22.) 
22. There is no evidence in the record that the Bahrs knew or were aware that 
the Imuses were improving the disputed property. 
IV, SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the Imuses based 
on the application of boundary by equitable estoppel. The trial court improperly 
8 
concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact. This error was particularly 
significant based on the fact that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is a highly fact-
dependant issue. It is also important for the Court to remember and consider that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel is generally disfavored, narrowly and strictly construed, and 
applied by courts with caution. 
The doctrine of boundary by equitable estoppel requires several elements and 
conditions be established to justify the imposition of this doctrine. These requirements 
include: First, actual wrongdoing by the party to be estopped- Second, silence or inaction 
by a party cannot form the basis of estoppel. Third, the party who is sought to be 
estopped must have had actual knowledge of the alleged misrepresented facts. Fourth, a 
party who is at fault for his own circumstances may not invoke the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel. Fifth, the Court requires that permanent improvements be made on the disputed 
parcel of land. In order to grant summary judgment the Court must look at the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. The facts presented in this case 
preclude the Imuses from the protection of equitable estoppdl and, therefore, the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Imuses. 
The trial court's reliance on Dahl in rendering summary judgment in favor of the 
Imuses was in error. The Dahl case can be distinguished from the case-in-chief in several 
ways. First and foremost, Dahl was appealed following a trial on the merits. As 
previously mentioned, the opportunity for each party to present their case is imperative 
9 
when dealing with such a fact-dependant doctrine. The second major distinguishing 
factor is based on the differences in the facts of the two cases. In Dahl, the party seeking 
equitable estoppel was a hapless, unwitting victim of the confusibn/ignorance that 
occurred many years before they possessed the land. However, in this case, the Imuses 
actually participated in every aspect of the measurement, planning, and construction of 
the fence line which led to the confusion. The trial court's complete reliance on the Dahl 
case was in error. 
The court also erred in granting summary judgment based on the legal theory of 
counter estoppel. The Imuses should be estopped from arguing estoppel against the Bahrs 
based on the doctrine of counter estoppel. This doctrine holds that a party seeking to 
estop a second party may itself be estopped from asserting the doctrine of estoppel against 
the second party where fairness and equity so require. The court failed to apply the 
doctrine of counter estoppel and therefor erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
the Imuses. 
Furthermore, to the extent that it is found the Imuses entered into any sort of an 
agreement with the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, such finding should not bind the 
Bahrs. Authority exists, which is both persuasive and logical, that supports the 
determination that estoppel will not bind a bona fide purchaser without notice of an 
estoppel. In this case, the Bahrs are bona fide purchasers and were not in privity with the 
Wymans. 
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Finally, the trial court's application of equitable estoppel was also inappropriate 
because it is contrary to public policy. When an interest in real property is at issue, 
equitable estoppel should only be employed in order to preveht a gross injustice under 
circumstances strictly complying with the principles of estoppel. However, in the present 
matter, the doctrine was used to bypass the doctrines of boundary by agreement and 
boundary by acquiescence. The court's ruling effectively transfers title in real estate at 
the instant unwitting adjoining landowners construct a poorly measured fence and 
landscape their respective properties. 
V. ARGUMENT 
In the case at bar, the trial court erred in its application of equitable estoppel where 
there are genuine issues of material fact and where the Imuses were not entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
In analyzing this case, it is important to remember that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is a highly fact-dependent issue. See Dahl Inv. Co. y. Hughes, 2004 UT App. 
391 [^ 8, 101 P.3d 830. Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is generally 
disfavored, narrowly and strictly construed, and applied by the Court with caution. 31 
C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 75; 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 41; see also 
Western Kane County Special Service District No. I v. Jackspn Cattle Company, 744 
P.2d 1376, 1377-1378 (Utah 1987) ("we are extremely reluctant to apply the doctrine of 
estoppel against the assertion of rights in a public highway by a government entity"). 
11 
Numerous state courts have set forth statements disfavoring the application of the 
doctrine and directing that its elements be narrowly applied.3 Equitable estoppel is 
disfavored by the law because the doctrine precludes parties from presenting the truth and 
prevents parties from asserting claims and arguments otherwise available at law. 28 Am. 
Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 41 ("no party ought to be precluded from making out his 
case according to its truth unless by force of some positive principle of law"); 31 C.J.S. 
Estoppel and Waiver § 75 ("the doctrine, when applied, contravenes the technical, legal 
rights of the person estopped, stays the operation of the usual machinery employed to 
adjust personal rights, and halts proceedings to make certain of justice, and hence is 
somewhat of a superlaw, arbitrary and penal in nature and character"). Due to these 
concerns, the equitable estoppel doctrine "must be applied strictly and should not be 
enforced unless substantiated in every particular." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 
3Gross v. Sunding, 161 P. 3d 380 (Wash. App. 2007); Moroux v. Toce, 943 So.2d 1263 
(La. App. 2006); Barry Simon Development, Inc v. Hale, 210 S.W.3d 312 (Mo. App. 2006); 
Oster v. Valley County, 140 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2006); Burks v. Elevation Outdoor Advertising, 
LLC, 220 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. App. 2006); B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc. v. Wedgeworth, 911 So.2d 
483 (Miss. 2005); Makowski v. Waldrop, 584 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. App. 2003); Stickney v. City of 
Saco, 770 A.2d 592 (Me. 2001); U.S. Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. v. Indiana Dept. ofTransp., 
714 N.E.2d 1244 (Ind. App. 1999); McElligott v. Lukes, 61A N.E.2d 1108 (Mass. App. 1997); 
Badgett v. New York Health and Hospitals Corp., 641 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); 
Kruse v. Department of Public Aid, 596 N.E.2d 743 (111. App. 1992); Gorley v. Parizek, 475 
N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 991); Dove v. Deldado, 808 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1991); Gonzales v. Teskey, 465 
N.W.2d 525 (Wis. App. 1990); International Assn. Of Fire Fighters v. City of San Leandro, 226 
Cal.Rptr.238 (Cal. App. 1986); Capital Bank v. Schuler All So.2d 633 (Fla. App. 1982); 
Schneider v. Washington, Nat, Ins.Co., 437 P.2d 798 (Kan. 1968); Modern Auto Finance Corp. v. 
Preston, 202 A.2d 845 (Conn. App. 1964); State v. Raymond, 119 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1963); 
Wisel v. Terhune, 204 P.2d 286 (Okla.1949); Commercial Securities v. Hall, 15 P.2d 483 (Or. 
1932). 
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41. Moreover, where an interest in real property is at issue, the Court should be all the 
more cautious in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Restatement (Third) of 
Property (Servitudes) § 7.6 (2000). Also, the Court should upe caution in its application 
of equitable estoppel affecting interest in real property becaiise the policies supporting 
estoppel are in direct conflict with the strong public policies underlying the Statue of 
Frauds and recording statutes which generally require that a transfer or modification of an 
interest in real property be "evidenced by formal written instruments." See Restatement 
(Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 7.6 (2000). 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF THE IMUSES ON THE ISSUE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
The application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel i^  inappropriate in this matter. 
Simply stated, the elements of equitable estoppel have been [set forth as: "conduct by one 
party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting 
in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct." United 
American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 
1982). In analyzing cases under these broad elements, the Cdurt has set forth numerous 
nuanced requirements, which must likewise be established to justify the imposition of 
equitable estoppel. 
These nuanced requirements include, but are not necessarily limited to, the 
following: First, actual wrongdoing on the part of the party against whom equitable 
estoppel is being asserted is required. See Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 
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28, Tf 15, 158 P.3d 1088; see also Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 
(Utah 1976). Second, silence or inaction, standing alone, cannot form the basis of 
estoppel, absent an element of unconscionability on the part of the person sought to be 
estopped. See IHC Health Servs. v. D & KMgtnt, Inc., 2003 UT 5, | 11, 73 P.3d 320; 
see also Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah 1985). Third, the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is only applicable where the party who is sought to be estopped had 
actual knowledge of the material facts. See Barnard, 700 P.2d at 1115. Fourth, a party 
may not invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel when that party is at fault for his own 
circumstances. See Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
(quoting Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697). Also, a party is precluded from invoking equitable 
estoppel where the material facts were equally within the knowledge of both the party 
invoking the doctrine and the party against whom the estoppel is sought. Barnard, 700 
P.2d at 1115-1116. Finally, in addition to the above, the Court requires that permanent 
improvements be made on the disputed parcel. Peterson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 697, 698 
(Utah 1934) (citing Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912 (Utah 1928), and 69 A. L. R. 1417). 
In general, "equitable estoppel reflects circumstances where it is not fair for a party 
to represent facts to be one way to get the other to agree, and then change positions later 
to the other's detriment." Youngblood, 2007 UT at Tf 15. 
Each of these elements will be discussed in greater detail below. 
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A, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FRAUD 
NOR MISREPRESENTATION BY THE B^HRS, NOR THEIR 
PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST 
Whereas estoppel is a doctrine of equity, the purpose of the doctrine is to 
effectuate justice or to prevent an injustice. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 75. In 
Utah, estoppel is: 
[A] doctrine of equity purposed to rescue from loss a party who has, 
without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect 
of another. . . . Estoppel arises when a party . . . by his acts, representations, 
or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or 
through culpable negligence, induces another . . . to believe certain facts to 
exist and that such other . . . acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, 
relies and acts thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the former . . . is 
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 
Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697. Therefore, it is fundamental that tfiere be actual wrongdoing on 
the part of the party who is sought to be estopped. See Youn^blood, 2007 UT at f 15; see 
also Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697; see also Kelly v. Richards, 83 P.2d 731, 734 (1938) 
(equitable estoppel is only invoked when the conduct and circumstances would otherwise 
perpetrate a fraud or unfair advantage). Moreover, in applying the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, the Court has generally required that there be an actual fraud or 
misrepresentation of fact. Youngblood, 2007 UT at \ 15; Barnard, 700 P.2d at 1115; 
Kelly, 83 P.2d at 734; Jefferson Life & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, J 20 So.2d 160, 163 (Miss. 
1960); 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 47. 
In the present matter, there has been no fraud or misrepresentation of fact by the 
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Bahrs or their predecessors in interest, the Wymans. Neither has ever been alleged. The 
Imuses approached the Wymans and asked if they would be interested in placing a fence 
between their respective properties, to which the Wymans agreed. (R at 217-218, ^ 2-3.) 
Jim Imus assisted Brent Wyman in the measurement of the 2074 Buckingham Way 
property in an effort to determine the proper boundary line to place the Fence. (R at 711, 
pg. 36:11-13.) After measurements were completed, the Imuses and Wymans both 
believed that the Fence properly marked the boundary between their respective properties. 
(R at 711-712, pgs. 34:13-36:13, 37:16-18; see also R at 684, pg 57:10-58:12.) No 
survey was every obtained. (R at 712, pg. 38:14-15; see also R at 680, pg. 43:7-8.) 
Unfortunately, as was later determined, the Imuses and Wymans had made a mistake4 in 
their measurements, which resulted in the misplacement of the Fence. None of the 
Wymans' involvement, acts, or statements amounted to fraud or a misrepresentation of 
fact. Also, the record is devoid of any evidence that the placement of the Fence resolved 
an actual dispute or disagreement about the proper boundary line between the 2074 and 
2084 Buckingham Way properties. 
After the Bahrs acquired their property, the Bahrs commented to and questioned 
the Imuses several times over the years that the Fence did not appear to be straight and 
that they believed it encroached upon their property, which the Imuses repeatedly denied 
4The party most responsible for this mistake, if there is any fault, appears to have 
resulted by the Imuses' failure to properly locate and measure their own property, as 
reflected in their survey obtained after this action was initiated. (R at 561.) 
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was the case because the Imuses had measured and properly placed the Fence on the 
boundary line when it was installed. (R at 748-749, pgs. 15:^3-18:12; see also R at 749, 
pg. 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; R at 752, pgs. 31:24-32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-
35:11; R at 754, pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-45:22; R at ^56, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 
757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R at 758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 
776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, pgs. 16:2^-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-
21:5; R at 730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-24; R at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, 
pgs. 70:2-71:2; and see also Rat 782-783, pgs. 13:7-15:6; Rat 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) 
The Imuses have only paid the property taxes for their property, which does not include 
any payment on the disputed property. (R at 693, pgs.94:5-95:15.) All taxes assessed on 
the disputed property since the Fence was installed have been paid by the Bahrs or their 
predecessors in interest. Again, nothing done or said by the feahrs amounts to fraud or a 
misrepresentation of fact and this element has not been satisfied. 
B. THE APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL WAS IN ERROR 
BECAUSE THE BAHRS DID NOT ACT WITH FULL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATERIAL FAC|TS 
The trial court erred in its application of the equitable estoppel doctrine where the 
Bahrs did not have actual knowledge or even any knowledge of the true boundary line. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is only applicable where the party who is sought to be 
estopped acted with actual knowledge of the relevant facts. $ee Barnard, 700 P.2d at 
1115(refusing to apply equitable estoppel where there was nothing in the record to 
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suggest that the party to be estopped had knowledge of the deficiencies in the legal 
description of deed); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 45. 
The Utah rule referenced in Barnard, is consistent with the majority rule outlined 
in American Jurisprudence, Second Edition. American Jurisprudence summarizes the 
majority rule which states that "for estoppel to apply, the party against whom the estoppel 
is asserted must have acted with full knowledge of the material facts and his rights or 
have knowledge at the time the representations are made that the representations are 
untrue, or at least that he should have had the means at hand of knowing all the facts, or 
have been in such a position that he ought to have known them." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel 
and Waiver § 45. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel should not be applied in this case in accordance 
with the above-outlined principles. In the present matter, there are no facts in record to 
suggest that the Bahrs had actual knowledge that the Imuses were making any supposed 
improvements to the disputed parcel. Therefore, it is inappropriate to impose equitable 
estoppel in the case at bar. Moreover, the Bahrs did not have actual knowledge of the 
true boundary line until they obtained a survey. (R at 794; see also R at 742, pg. 70:2-
16.) The Bahrs purchased their property on or about December 1988, which was several 
years after the Imuses planned out and constructed the Fence. (R at 217-218, ^ 2-3.) 
While the Bahrs inquired with the Imuses as to the true boundary line, the Bahrs were 
assured by the Imuses that the fence was located on the true boundary line. (R at 748-
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749, pgs. 15:23-18:12; see also R at 749, pg. 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; R at 
752, pgs. 31:24-32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R at 754 pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 
44:7-45:22; R at 756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-
57:7; R at 758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 
728, pgs. 16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, pgs+ 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 
34:20-24; R at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; and see also R at 782-783, pgs. 
13:7-15:6; Rat 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) The Bahrs were not in a position to have actual 
knowledge of the true boundary line. Therefore, the trial court erred in its application of 
equitable estoppel and its ruling should be reversed. 
C. THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IN ERROR 
WHEREAS THERE IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF 
UNCONSCIONABILITY TO THE BAHRS' SUPPOSED SILENCE 
The trial court erred in its application of the doctrine 6f equitable estoppel whereas 
there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the Bahrs remained silent 
and where, assuming arguendo that the Bahrs did not present an issue of material fact, 
there was no showing beyond mere silence or acquiescence on the part of the Bahrs. 
Silence or inaction, standing alone, cannot form the basis of Estoppel. See IHC Health 
Servs., 2003 UT at f^ 11; see also Barnard, 700 P.2d at 1115; 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and 
Waiver § 60 ( "mere silence or inaction is generally not a grqund for estoppel, unless 
there is a duty to speak or act. . . [t]here must be some element of turpitude or negligence 
connected with the silence or inaction by which the other parity is misled to his injury."). 
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Moreover, the Court has determined that "estoppel by acquiescence is applicable when 'it 
would be unconscionable to permit a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one 
in which he . . . has acquiesced.'" IHC Health Servs., 2003 UT at f 11 (quoting 28 Am. 
Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 57 (1966)). 
In the present matter, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 
Bahrs remained silent concerning the boundary line. The Bahrs questioned the line but 
the Imuses always assured the Bahrs that the line was properly measured. (R at 748-749, 
pgs. 15:23-18:12; see also R at 749, pg. 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; R at 752, 
pgs. 31:24-32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R at 754, pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-
45:22; R at 756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R 
at 758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, 
pgs. 16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-
24; R at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; and see also R at 782-783, pgs. 13:7-
15:6; R at 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) Whereas the alleged silence formed the basis for the 
Imuses estoppel defense and the trial court's ruling, summary judgment was not 
appropriate on the issue of equitable estoppel. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the 
Bahrs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the acquiescence issue, there were 
no facts in record to demonstrate anything beyond mere silence on the part of the Bahrs. 
The Imuses failed to point to any evidence in record showing turpitude or negligence on 
the part of the Bahrs. 
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Moreover, it would not be unconscionable to allow the Barhs to present evidence 
and argument concerning the true boundary line. First, the B|ahrs did not participate in 
any part of the construction of the fence. Second, the Bahrs questioned the true boundary 
line and received assurances from the Imuses that the line w^s true. Id. Third, there is no 
evidence in record that the supposed improvements were made during the Bahrs' 
possession of the property, that such improvements were mape on the disputed parcel, or 
that the Bahrs had knowledge of such improvements. Finally, the parties had equal 
access to legal descriptions and recorded deeds in order to ascertain the true boundary. 
There can be no estoppel against the Bahrs unless their actions were unconscionable. 
Reviewing all facts in the light most favorable to the Bahrs, it was error for the trial court 
to grant summary judgment in favor of the Imuses. Consequently, the trial court's ruling 
should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
D. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE THE 
IMUSES ARE NOT INNOCENT VICTIM^ 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment wjhereas the Imuses are not 
blameless victims and could not, therefore, reasonably rely on any actions of the Bahrs. 
A party may not invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel when that party is at fault for 
his own circumstances. See Masters, 111 P.2d at 503, (quoting Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697 
("equitable estoppel may be invoked only to aid a party who^ without fault of his or her 
own, was 'deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another'"); see also 
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984) ("he who seeks equity must do 
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equity"); see also Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1985) ("equity refuses to lend 
its aid to a party whose conduct is inequitable"); see also Jefferson Life & Cas. Co., 120 
So.2d at 163 ("a party cannot predicate an estoppel in his favor on his own dereliction, 
omission, or inadvertence where there is no concealment, misrepresentation, or other 
inequitable conduct on the part of the other party"); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and 
Waiver § 40 ("It is fundamental that a person cannot predicate an estoppel in his favor on 
his own dereliction, omission, or inadvertence where there is no concealment, 
misrepresentation, or other inequitable conduct by the other party"); see also 28 Am. Jur. 
2d Estoppel and Waiver § 52 ("as a general rule, a person will not be permitted to take an 
advantage of, or to question the validity of, propriety of, any act of another which was 
committed upon his own request or was caused by his own conduct"). 
In the present matter, the Imuses were not hapless victims who were deluded by 
the malfeasance of another party into taking a course of action. There was no persuasion 
in this matter of the sort envisioned by Youngblood where an ill-intending party 
represented facts to be one way to get the innocent party to agree, and then changed 
positions later to the innocent party's detriment. See Youngblood, 2007 UT at f 15. In 
the instant case, the Imuses directly contributed to their own circumstances. The Imuses 
planned, measured out, and constructed the fence along what they believed to be the 
property line. (R at 711, pg. 33:2-20; see also R at 683, pg. 53:9-55:17; and R at 678-
679, pgs. 36:24-37:2.) Years later when the Bahrs acquired an interest in the adjoining 
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party, the Imuses assured the Bahrs that the fence had been properly measured and placed 
on the property line. (R at 748-749, pgs. 15:23-18:12; see at$o R at 749, pg. 21:10-25; R 
at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; Rat 752, pgs. 31:24-32:21; Rat 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; Rat 754, 
pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-45:22; R at 756, pgs. 46:7-4^:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-
51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R at 758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 
129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, pgs. 16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, 
pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-24; R at 741, pg. 66:9-2(^; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; 
and see also Rat 782-783, pgs. 13:7-15:6; Rat 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) By participating in 
all aspects of the construction of the fence and by intentionally or negligently misleading 
the Bahrs concerning the true boundary line, the Imuses' directly contributed to their own 
supposed injuries such that it cannot be said that they are without fault. Therefore, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel is not available to the Imuses atid the trial court erred in 
determining otherwise. 
Related to the issue of fault, a party is likewise precluded from invoking equitable 
estoppel where the material facts were equally within the knowledge of both the party 
invoking the doctrine and the party against whom the estoppel is sought. Barnard, 700 
P.2d at 1115-1116. The case of Barnard is particularly instructive on this point. In 
Barnard, a son sued his mother to specifically enforce an oral land sales contract between 
them. Barnard, 700 P.2d at 1114. The trial court refused to specifically enforce the oral 
contract because it deemed the contract "too indefinite to permit specific enforcement." 
23 
Id. On appeal, the son argued that his mother should be equitably estopped from asserting 
any deficiency in the description in her defense against him because "she accepted full 
payment of the purchase price, failed to inform [him] of the warranty deed to Paul, and 
allowed [him] to believe he had a binding contract to buy the land." Id. at 1115. In 
denying the son's equitable estoppel argument against his mother the court stated the 
following: 
The description of the land to be conveyed under the parol agreement, 
however, was equally within the knowledge of both [son] and [mother]. 
There is nothing on the record even implying that [mother] knew the 
contract was unenforceable because of a deficiency in the description of 
land. . . . [Son] has failed to establish even a prima facie basis for applying 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel here... Further, since the property 
description in the oral agreement between [mother] and [son] was equally 
within their knowledge, [son] could not have relied on any 
misrepresentation by Ruth as to the land to be conveyed under the 
agreement. Moreover, nothing in the record implies that there was any such 
misrepresentation by [mother]. Thus, there is no basis for applying the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case. 
Id. at 1115-16. 
In this case, as in Barnard, the Imuses were not, without fault of their own, 
deluded into taking any course of action, either by the Bahrs or the Bahrs' predecessors in 
interest. To the contrary, the Imuses were active participants in the events leading to their 
supposed injury. First, the Imuses initiated the construction of the fence by approaching 
all of the neighbors about whether they would be amenable to building a fence. (R at 
217-218, t1f 2-3; see also R at 710, pg. 31:3 - 32:2.) Second, the Imuses participated in 
all phases of the fence construction, including measuring the supposed boundary line, 
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purchasing the materials, and building the fence. (R at 711, pg. 33:2-20; see also R at 
683, pg. 53:9-55:17; and R at 678-679, pgs. 36:24-37:2.) Tlje Imuses, therefore, did not 
rely on any negligent or intentional misrepresentations by anyone to any more or less 
degree than they relied upon their own negligent or intentional actions. In fact, the 
Imuses mislead the Bahrs about the true boundary line, claiming at each inquiry from the 
Bahrs that the Imuses had properly measured and placed the fence on the true boundary 
line. Moreover, the true boundary line was equally within th^ knowledge of the parties 
whereas either party could have commissioned (and eventually each of the parties did 
commission) a survey to set forth the true boundary line according to the legal description 
of the adjoining properties. (R at 794, 796.) In the present r^atter, the Imuses had, at a 
minimum, equal knowledge with the Bahrs and their predecessors in interest about all 
aspects of the boundary. Accordingly, the Imuses defense of equitable estoppel fails as a 
matter of law and the trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
E. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE THE 
IMUSES FAILED TO ASSERT OR ESTABLISH THAT 
PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS WERE PLACED ON THE 
DISPUTED PROPERTY 
In addition to the arguments set forth above, the doctrine of boundary by equitable 
estoppel in property disputes in Utah requires the establishment of permanent 
improvements on the disputed parcel. "So far as is made to appear, no permanent 
improvements were placed on the land in question and hence defendant is not in a 
position to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in aid of| his claim." Peterson, 34 
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P.2d at 698 (citing Tripp, 276 P. 912; 69 A. L. R. 1417). There are few examples of what 
qualifies as a permanent improvement in Utah. In Dahl, the Utah Court of Appeals found 
that a driveway under construction for eighteen (18) months qualified as a permanent 
improvement. Dahl Investment Co., 2004 UT App.at ff 3, 15. Another case found the 
following qualified as permanent improvements: 'Tiling in front of premises, board floor 
with maple top, stairs in broken stairway, repair of men's toilet and construction of ladies' 
toilet and connecting them with sewer, changing old wooden steps on West Temple side 
of building to cement, modern electric wiring of No. 79, outside painting, placing floor 
ventilator, and placing paneling inside." Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 104 P.2d 619, 623 
(Utah 1940). 
Other jurisdictions provide some additional guidance. The Supreme Court in Iowa 
has held the digging of shallow trenches, placement of footings, and removal of such do 
not qualify as permanent improvements. Dart v. Thompson, 154 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Iowa 
1967). Also, it found a patio made of 1000 bricks laid on the ground in sand and planted 
flowers and bushes did not qualify as permanent improvements. Mahrenholz v. Alff, 112 
N.W.2d 847, 851-52 (Iowa 1962). 
The Supreme Court of Idaho opined that the construction of an irrigation ditch did 
not qualify as a valuable or permanent improvement sufficient to invoke the equitable 
estoppel doctrine. Downing v. Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306, 309 (Idaho 1960). 
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee found the following did not qualify as 
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permanent improvements: (1) a trailer home because there was no evidence that it could 
not be removed; (2) a sewage disposal system because there Was no evidence of the cost 
nor how it would benefit the defendants; and (3) a fence because there was no evidence of 
its cost or usefulness to defendants. Gorbics v. Close, 722 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tenn.App. 
1986). 
Also, a Florida court stated: "As to boundary by estopbel, although the Evanses 
describe various improvements they made to their property, there is no indication that any 
of the improvements are in fact on the disputed strip along their southern boundary." 
Evans v. Forte, 510 So.2d 327, 331 (Fla Dist. App. 1987). 
In applying the above law and guidance to this case, tfce Imuses have failed to 
establish that any permanent improvements were made to the disputed parcel of property. 
Jim Imus testified to the following regarding what improvements were made to the 
disputed property: 
A. . . . We plant things in it, we water it, we care fpr it, we enjoy it. . . . 
Q. . . . What things have you planted in it? 
A. Lots of things. Trees, shrubs, perennials, we've got birth baths on it, 
we've got bird feeders and trees on it, vines, grjound covers, lots of 
stuff . . . 
Q. If you lose the disputed portion of the land is tl|at going to impact 
your ability to use the other portion of your yar^? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How? 
A. By the shading and privacy. 
(R at 712-713, pgs. 40:6-41:12.) Also, nowhere in the record nor in the Imuses statement 
of undisputed facts, as contained in their Memorandum in Siipport of Defendants' Motion 
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for Summary Judgment, do the Imuses claim the disputed property contains any 
permanent improvements.3 (R at 463-470.) The Imuses' sole improvement to the 
disputed property, as claimed in their Memorandum, is "landscaping."6 (R at 468, f 24.) 
Planting trees, shrubs, flowers and other vegetation does not qualify as a permanent 
improvement. Nor does the potential loss of shading and privacy act as a sufficient basis 
to invoke the boundary by equitable estoppel doctrine. Based upon these deficiencies, in 
addition to the other arguments contained herein, the Imuses' boundary by equitable 
estoppel claim should be denied and this matter reversed and remanded to the trial court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S SOLI] RELIANCE UPON DAHL IN RENDERING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE IMUSES WAS IN ERROR 
The trial court's reliance on Dahl Inv. Co. (hereinafter Dahl) is misplaced. In 
Dahl, the parties' predecessors in interest acquiesced to a certain fence as the boundary 
important to note in reading the Imuses' statement of undisputed facts is the 
Imuses refer to their entire yard as "property" and the portion of their yard in dispute as 
the "Disputed Parcel." (R at 466-467, % 18.) 
6Imuses claim they "constructed improvements on their property up to the 
Boundary Fence." (R at 464, f 7.) Imuses also claim "[m]oving the boundary at this 
point would not only require the Imuses to incur significant expense, but would cause 
them significant inconvenience, as irrigation systems would have to be relocated, their 
storage shed would have to be removed altogether, and they would lose virtually all of the 
irreplaceable mature landscaping on the west side of their property." (R at 468, ^ f 23.) 
Despite these broad assertions, there are several note worthy problems when applied to 
the boundary by equitable estoppel. First, no evidence exists in the record to document 
what "significant expense" would be incurred to move the Fence to the proper boundary 
line. Second, in regards to inconvenience, the Imuses fail to inform the court that the 
irrigation systems that must be relocated are not underground, but are hanging from the 
Fence and can be easily moved with the fence. (R at 323.) Finally, the storage shed is not 
on the "Disputed Parcel", as reflected by both surveys. (R at 559, 56 L) 
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line between the properties from 1925 to 1965. Dahl Inv. Co., 2004 UT App. At Tj 3. 
One of the general partners of the plaintiff corporation acquitted the property from his 
parents. Id. The general partner eventually transferred his interest in the property to 
plaintiff. Id. The property, however, had been in the general partner's family since 1923. 
Id. Sometime between 1965 and 1999, the defendants acquired the property adjoining 
that of the plaintiff. Id. However, by the time the defendants purchased the property, the 
fence separating the properties had deteriorated. Id. In 1999 the defendants began 
building a driveway that straddled the former fence line. Id. During the eighteen-month 
construction period, the plaintiffs failed to notify defendants that the driveway encroached 
on plaintiffs property. Id. Following a bench trial on the merits where the defendants 
had invoked the equitable estoppel doctrine, the district court applied equitable estoppel 
and determined that the property occupying the driveway belonged to defendants. Id. at f^ 
4. On appeal, the Court determined in a brief analysis that the trial court had not abused 
its discretion. Id. at f 15. 
The present matter can readily be distinguished from bahl. First and foremost, 
Dahl was appealed following a trial on the merits. Id. at f 5. On appeal, the Court 
granted great deference to the trier of fact, stating that "because of the fact-dependent 
nature of this determination, 'we grant. . . broadened discretion to the trial court on the 
issue of equitable estoppel.'" Id. at | 8, (quoting Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 
P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Therefore the Court reviewed the matter under an 
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abuse of discretion standard. Id. at f^ 15. The present matter, however, was disposed of 
by the district court on summary judgment, which the Court now reviews on an appeal for 
correctness. In the case at bar, the Court on appeal is not required to give any deference 
to the district Court and should consider, in addition to the broad estoppel elements set 
forth in Dahl, the general principles of equitable estoppel, as outlined in our brief. 
Moreover, the facts in the present matter are distinguishable. In the present matter, 
the Imuses are not hapless, unwitting victims. In Dahl, the party seeking the protection of 
estoppel had acquired the property years after the acquiescence and years after the fence 
had long since fallen into a state of total disrepair. Id. at f 3. Undoubtedly justified in 
their confusion/ignorance regarding the true boundary line, the party claiming estoppel in 
Dahl then constructed a driveway where the fence once stood. Id. In the case at bar, the 
roles of the parties are reversed whereas the party seeking the protection of estoppel (the 
Imuses) had been in possession of their property prior to the fence being constructed and 
the party to be estopped (the Bahrs) acquired the adjoining property after the fence had 
already been constructed. The Imuses, in fact, participated in every aspect of the 
measurement, planning, and construction of the fence line. (R at 711, pg. 33:2-20; see 
also R at 683, pg. 53:9-55:17; and R at 678-679, pgs. 36:24-37:2.) Moreover, the Bahrs, 
after acquiring the adjoining property, questioned whether the fence was the true 
boundary line and were assured by the Imuses that the fence had been measured and was 
on the true boundary. The Imuses, therefore, don't have the benefit of claiming ignorance 
30 
or uncertainty of the true boundary, as could the defendants in Dahl. The Imuses cannot, 
therefore, assign blame to the Bahrs for the conduct of the Imuses. 
Furthermore, there are no facts in record to suggest that the Bahrs would have had 
notice of the improvements and that the Imuses, therefore, relied on the Bahrs' alleged 
silence in making the supposed improvements to their property. In Dahl, the party 
seeking the protection of estoppel, being in ignorance and/or uncertainty of the boundary 
line, engaged in construction of an improvement that was op$n and notorious whereas it 
was built on top of the former fence line (straddling the properties and clearly 
encroaching on the estopped party's side of the former fence line). Id. Furthermore, the 
project in Dahl took eighteen months to complete. Id. During the eighteen month period 
of construction, the estopped party in Dahl failed to notify the defendants that the 
driveway was encroaching on its property, even though the driveway straddled what had 
once been the fence line. Id. In the present case, there are no facts in the record to 
suggest any permanent improvements on the same scale as those in Dahl. There are no 
facts in the case at bar to indicate the time frame of the supposed improvements, other 
than years passed for growth of landscaping. There is nothing in the record to suggest 
that the Bahrs would have had knowledge of extensive improvements to the Imuses 
property such that the Bahrs supposed failure to object would give rise to reasonable 
reliance on the part of the Imuses. To the contrary, the Bahrs regularly questioned the 
Imuses about the fence at issue and the true nature of the boundary line. (R at 748-749, 
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pgs. 15:23-18:12; see also R at 749, pg 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; R at 752, 
pgs. 31:24-32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R at 754, pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-
45:22; R at 756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R 
at 758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, 
pgs. 16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-
24; R at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; and see also R at 782-783, pgs. 13:7-
15:6; R at 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) Accordingly, in contrast to Dahl, there was no 
reasonable reliance on the part of the Imuses. 
The supposed landscaping improvements set forth by the Imuses are insufficient 
to form the basis of equitable estoppel. In Dahl, the driveway straddled the former fence 
like, hence the improvements were made to the parcel in controversey. Id. Moreover, 
unlike the driveway in Dahl, there are no facts in the case at bar to establish any supposed 
improvements were permanent. 
III. THE IMUSES SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ESTOPPEL 
AGAINST THE BAHRS 
The Imuses should be estopped from arguing estoppel against the Bahrs. Pursuant 
to the doctrine of counter estoppel (or estoppel against estoppel), a party seeking to estop 
a second party may itself be estopped from asserting the doctrine of estoppel against the 
second party where fairness and equity so require. See Operis Group Corp. v. E.L At 
Doral, LLC, 973 So.2d 485, 489-490 (Fla Dist. App. 1987); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Estoppel and Waiver § 132 ("one party to a transaction may be denied the right to assert 
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an estoppel against the other party by reason of certain facts which create an estoppel 
against the party seeking to assert the estoppel"); see also 31 CJ.S. Estoppel and Waiver 
§ 78 ("a party may be precluded by counter estoppel from asserting an estoppel"). The 
doctrine of counter estoppel also operates to preclude a party from seeking estoppel 
"when that party alone is responsible for facts which constitute the estoppel." 28 Am. 
Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 132. Where the Court finds an estoppel and a counter 
estoppel, "one estoppel neutralizes the other, leaving the matter as if neither estoppel had 
been offered." See Operis Group Corp., 973 So.2d at 489-490; see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Estoppel and Waiver § 132 ("two estoppels may destroy or neutralize each other"); see 
also 31 CJ.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 78 (where the doctrine is applied, "the matter in 
issue is to be determined and disposed of otherwise than by application of the doctrine of 
estoppel"). 
In the present matter, the Imuses approached the Wymans (the Bahr's predecessors 
in interest) about the prospect of building a fence to separate the properties. (R at 217-
218, f^ f 2-3.) Choosing not to avail themselves of the services of a surveyor, the Imuses 
and the Wymans measured together what they believed to be the property line. (R at 711-
712, pgs. 34:13-36:13, 37:16-18; see also R at 684, pg 57:10-58:12; and R at 712, pg. 
38:14-15) The Imuses paid for the materials to construct the fence. (R at 710, pg. 32:8-
9.) The Imuses and the Wymans together constructed the fence along what they 
erroneously believed to be the property line. Several years later, the Wymans sold the 
33 
property to a buyer, who in turn sold to the Bahrs. (R at 248; see also R at 727, pgs 
12:18-13:6.) While the fact is disputed, the Bahrs presented admissible evidence in 
record that, they questioned the true boundary line between the properties but received 
assurances from the Imuses that the fence had been measured properl. (R at 748-749, 
pgs. 15:23-18:12; see also R at 749, pg. 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; R at 752, 
pgs. 31:24-32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R at 754, pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-
45:22; R at 756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R 
at 758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, 
pgs. 16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-
24; R at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; and see also R at 782-783, pgs. 13:7-
15:6; Rat 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) 
The Bahrs relied on the statements of the Imuses that the fence had been properly 
measured and constructed on the true boundary line. The Bahrs did so to their own 
detriment as the Imuses have now, after the statutory period has expired, successfully 
argued at the trial level that the Bahrs should be precluded from presenting arguments and 
evidence concerning the true boundary line. Moreover, between the parties to the present 
action, the Imuses are solely responsible for the facts giving rise to their estoppel claim 
against the Bahrs. Where the Imuses measured what they thought to be the boundary line, 
then constructed the fence on the erroneous line, and treated that line as the boundary for 
several years prior to and subsequent to the Bahrs' purchase of the adjoining property, it 
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is unconscionable for the Imuses to now blame the Bahrs for the Imuses' own error and 
for the Imuses to argue that, had the Bahrs rescued the Imuses from their own error, the 
Imuses would not have been injured. Accordingly, the Imuses should be estopped from 
seeking an estoppel against the Bahrs and the trial court's gr^nt of summary judgment 
should be reversed. 
IV. THE BAHRS SHOULD NOT BE BOUND BY ANY ALLEGED 
AGREEMENT OR CONDUCT BY THE BAHRS1 PREDECESSORS IN 
INTEREST WITH RESPECT TO THE IMUSES 
In addition to the arguments above, to the extent it could be found the Bahrs' 
predecessors in interest, the Wymans, entered into an agreement with the Imuses, any 
such agreement should not bind the Bahrs. For example, estoppel only exists "as between 
the same parties or those in legal privity with them." 31 C JJS. Estoppel and Waiver § 8 
(1996). Also, "a bona fide purchaser without notice of an estoppel against his or her 
grantor generally is not bound by an estoppel against the grantor." 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Estoppel and Waiver § 133. 
Although no Utah authority was found to indicate the above principles are Utah 
law, such principles make sense and have been followed elsewhere. For example, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals held as follows: 
"The general rule is that a grantee will not be estopped by any act, conduct, 
or declaration of his grantor of which the grantee had no notice even though 
such act, conduct or declaration would support estoppel against the 
grantor." . . . [Also], if Plaintiffs could qualify as bonk fide purchasers . . . 
they would take free of any secret outstanding equities not of record. 
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Evans v. Wittorff, 869 S.W.872, 875-76 (Mo. App. 1994) (quoting Hankins v. Ozark 
Forest Products, 658 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. App. 1983)). 
There is no evidence in the record that indicates the Bahrs were ever informed by 
the Imuses, Wymans, or any other individual about the discussions and actions that took 
place between the Imuses and Wymans regarding the Fence. The Bahrs were not in 
privity with the Wymans. Furthermore, the Bahrs were bona fide purchasers. As such, it 
would be inequitable, given the facts and law of this case, to invoke the boundary by 
equitable estoppel against the Bahrs based upon the conduct and/or statements made by 
their predecessors in interest to the Imuses. 
V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS ENTERED IN THIS MATTER 
CONTRAVENED PUBLIC POLICY 
The district court's ruling should be reversed because it is contrary to public 
policy. The grant of summary judgment in the present matter completely subverts the 
policies underlying the Statute of Frauds and the recording statutes while wholly 
bypassing the narrow and well delineated doctrines of boundary by agreement and 
boundary by acquiescence. The policy of preventing injustice that supports equitable 
estoppel is directly in conflict with the policy of preventing fraud and perjury underlying 
the Statute of Frauds and recording statutes. See Restatement (Third) of Property 
(Servitudes) § 7.6 (2000). Therefore, where an interest in real property is at issue, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied with caution. Id. 
Likewise, the doctrines of boundaiy by agreement and boundary by acquiescence 
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are restrictively applied in order to effectuate public policy iij favor of "promoting 
stability in land ownership," Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 1990), and 
"leaving at rest possible disputes over long established boundaries." Mason v. Loveless, 
2001 UT App 145, f 17, 24 P.3d 997. These are important, but narrow doctrines. See 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 423. The doctrine of equitable estoppel should not be used merely as 
a vehicle to avoid the restrictive elements of boundary by agreement and boundary by 
acquiescence. 
The practical consequence of the trial court's ruling is essentially whenever 
adjoining landowners erect a fence that is not located on the true boundary line, an 
instantaneous transfer in the title of property is effectuated as soon as the landowner 
landscapes the disputed parcel located on her side of the fence. Except in unusual 
circumstances where it is necessary to avoid manifest injustice, it is bad policy to employ 
estoppel in order to effectuate a transfer in title of real property without consideration, 
without a written instrument, and outside of the narrowly caryed out exceptions of 
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment was inappropriate because the Bahrs 
presented a genuine dispute of material fact and because the Imuses were not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The Bahrs presented evidence in record that they questioned the 
boundary line soon after acquiring an interest in their property. The Imuses assured the Bahrs 
that the fence was located on the true boundary line. Similarly, the Imuses did not present 
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evidence concerning when the supposed improvements were made and whether 
these improvements were located on the disputed parcel. Construing this evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Bahrs, the Imuses would be precluded the 
defense of equitable estoppel whereas the Imuses could not have reasonably made 
improvements to the disputed property and they have not established detrimental 
damages. 
Moreover, the Imuses' estoppel claim fails as a matter of law. First, 
assuming arguendo that the Bahrs did remain silent, the Bahrs did not engage in 
conduct that would give rise to estoppel. The Bahrs were not acting with full 
knowledge of the material facts or their rights. The Bahrs certainly did not 
misrepresent any material facts or act in an unconscionable manner. Second, the 
Imuses could not have relied on the Bahrs' conduct whereas the Bahrs questioned 
the boundary line. The Imuses similarly cannot argue that they relied on the Bahrs 
whereas the Imuses' fault contributed to their circumstances. The Imuses could 
likewise not rely on the Bahrs where the material facts were equally available to 
the parties. Third, the Imuses have failed to establish detrimental damages 
because they failed to present evidence that permanent improvements were made 
to the disputed parcel. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court. 
Dated this *-\ day of June, 2008. 
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APPENDIX 
Exhibit "A" Memorandum Decision 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
ROB BAHR, et al., : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, : Case No. 040906808 
v. : Judge PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
JIM IMUS, et al., : Date: September 11, 2007 
Defendants. : 
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents and Request for Attorney 
Fees, and the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Utah ELule of Civil Procedure 7. 
The parties argued these Motions to the Court on August 20. Having considered the arguments of the 
parties, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' Motions should be DENIED and Defendants' Motion 
should be GRANTED. The reasons for this decision are set forth more fully below. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
The Court relies only on the undisputed facts as a basis for its ruling. The Court acknowledges 
that there are disputed facts between the two parties regarding several of the theories alleged in the 
Complaint and Counterclaim. However, those factual disputes are not material to the Court's ultimate 
resolution of this case. A brief summary of the undisputed material facts before the Court is: 
1. Defendants Jim and Melodee Imus have lived in their current home at 2084 E. Buckingham Lane 
in Sandy, Utah, since March of 1983. 
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2. In the summer of 1983, the Imuses met with their neighbors, the Wymans, who owned the 
property adjacent to the west of the Imuses, to discuss buijding a boundary fence along the 
property line dividing the two residential properties. 
3. Though the lots were located in a platted subdivision and the neighbors consulted a plat map, the 
parties did not know the precise location of the boundary lin^ between their properties, nor did 
they obtain a survey.1 
4. The Imuses and Wymans then established a boundary line and the Imuses proceeded to construct 
a redwood fence on the agreed upon boundary line separating the two properties. 
5. The Imuses and Wymans thereafter treated this fence as a boundary between their properties and 
the Imuses installed improvements, landscaping and irrigation systems on their side of the fence. 
6. In 1984, the Wymans sold their property to Joe Carlisle, who also treated this fence as a boundary 
line between the properties until he sold the property to the Plaintiffs, Rob and Sherri Bahr, in 
December of 1988. 
7. No change in the treatment of the boundary line by the parties occurred until sometime in 2002 
or 2003.2 
1
 The Defendants neighbors to the east, the Daltons, also participated in measuring the 
properties and establishing the fence lines. 
2
 The parties disagree about when the Plaintiffs first began to dispute the fence as the 
boundary line. This is one of the key factual disputes in this casp, though, as will be discussed 
later, it is ultimately not material. 
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8. During this 20 or near 20 year period, the Defendants, in addition to installing a sprinkler system, 
landscaped the property to their liking, which included admitted costs of improvements of $7,000 
to$9,000.3 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on their claim of boundary by 
agreement and further argue that the Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming that the boundary fence does not 
mark the true boundary between the properties. The Plaintiffs counter that they are entitled to have title to 
the property quieted in them because none of the Defendants' Counterclaims has merit. Additionally, the 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' slander and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims. However, at the hearing, the Plaintiffs stipulated that their slander 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims should be dismissed. 
At the outset, the Court notes that the elements and ramifications of this State's rulings on the various 
doctrines at issue, specifically, boundary by agreement, boundary by estoppel, and boundary by 
acquiescence, and their interrelation with each other, are less than models of clarity. See Stoker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), Halladay v. duff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), and Tripp v. Bagley, 
75 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928). Not withstanding the Defendants' argument that boundary by agreement 
does not require a long period of time, the scant case law of the State regarding this matter indicates 
otherwise. Although the appellate courts have treated boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence 
3
 In paragraph 3 of the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs assert that total costs for all their 
improvements, including a koi pond, storage shed, and other landscaping, would be greatly in 
excess of this amount. However, the actual cost of the improvements to the Plaintiffs seems 
«-~ U~ <t-r r\r\n +^ <to n n n 
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as separate doctrines, as a practical matter, there seems to be little distinction between them. Therefore, the 
Court determines to consider the Defendants' claim of boundary by estoppel first and does so in light of the 
appellate courts' decisions regarding boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence. Because the 
estoppel claim disposes of the action, the Court declines to attempt to! resolve the difficult issue presented 
by the case law regarding boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence.4 
Boundary by estoppel "requires the combination of acts pr representations by the original 
landowner and reliance by a neighbor on those representations in ordbr to establish a boundary." Staker, 
785 P.2d at 423 n.4. "Equitable estoppel reflects circumstances where it is not fair for a party to 
represent facts to be one way to get the other to agree, and then change positions later to the other1 s 
detriment." Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 115;, 158 P.3d 1088. The Defendants 
argue that the elements of equitable estoppel in establishing a property line boundary are (1) an action 
or failure to act that is inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) an action or failure to act that is 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; and (3) a showing that injury would result from allowing 
repudiation of such action or failure to act. See Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, f 14, 
101 P.3d 830. In order to show "reasonable action" and injury, the Defendant needs to show that 
"permanent improvements were placed on the land in question." Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 93 
(Utah 1934). 
The Court finds that the Defendants have satisfied the elements of boundary by estoppel and so 
are entitled to ownership of the disputed property. In the present case, the undisputed evidence shows 
that the original landowners, the Wymans and the Imuses, represented to one another that the boundary 
4
 Additionally, the Court does not need to consider if the Defendants other claims of 
prescriptive easement, adverse oossession. or ocmmvincr risimsntc Uw* m t^-iV 
BAHR V. IMUS PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
they established was the property line between their respective lots. In reliance on those mutual 
representations, the Imuses built the fence as property line marker and then installed improvements on the 
property such as a shed, koi pond, and landscaping up to the fence line. The Wymans never objected to the 
Imuses or raised any complaint. After the Plaintiffs acquired the property formerly owned by the Wymans, 
at least for time, they did nothing to prevent the Defendants from maintaining and adding further 
improvements, such as vegetation and fixtures to the property at issue. 
The Court finds that Dahl Investments is instructive in this case. Dahl Investment primarily 
involved a boundary by acquiescence. In Dahl Investment, a fence stood between the two properties at 
issue for approximately 40 years, from 1925 to 1965 and the parties treated this fence as the boundary. 
However, after the fence had deteriorated, the defendant constructed a driveway which crossed over the 
original fence line. The plaintiff had not objected to the defendant building the driveway during its 
construction. The court held that the plaintiff had established a boundary by acquiescence to the fence 
line boundary and this boundary did not disappear once it had been established, even though the fence 
had not been maintained. 2004 UT App 391, at f l l . However, the court also held that, although the 
plaintiff had established that it was entitled to the boundary originally established by the fence, the 
plaintiff was estopped from claiming the portion of the property occupied by the driveway. Id. at ^ 15. 
The defendant was entitled to ownership of the driveway because removal of the driveway would 
constitute injury to the defendants. Id. 
Just as in Dahl Investments, the Court finds that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs may have been legally entitled to have the plat map boundary established as 
the legal boundary but that their actions (and the actions of their predecessors) estop them from asserting 
their legal rights. Specifically, the Court finds that the Defendants reasonably relied on the boundary as 
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established by the original owners, the Wymans, and not disputed for many years by the Plaintiffs. 
Additionally, the Court finds that the Defendants would be injured if Plaintiff were allowed to take 
possession of the disputed portion of property. It would inequitable to now allow the Plaintiffs to assert that 
the fence line is not the true boundary between the properties and the Plaintiffs are now estopped from doing 
so. 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel has been made obsolete by the Court's 
ruling on the Summary Judgment Motions. JJowever, the Court also finds that the Plaintiffs' Motion 
is without merit. Defendants have asserted that they have turned over all the requested documents in 
their possession. The Court is not persuaded at this point that Defendants have acted in bad faith or have 
been dishonest with the Court regarding disclosure of the requested materials. Therefore, the Court 
holds that the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel must be denied. 
ORDER 
Defendants are to prepare an appropriate order based on the' foregoing decision. 
DATED thi</Aday of September, 2007. 
PAUL 
DISTRI 
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